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## JUDICIARY-SUPREME COURT

### Appeals of administrative orders

- Modifies the Administrative Procedure Act regarding appeals by a party adversely affected by an order of an agency by doing all of the following:
  - Allowing an adversely affected party to appeal to the common pleas court in the county where a licensee's place of business is located or where the licensee is a resident, in lieu of appealing to the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas;
  - Requiring, instead of permitting, appeals from orders of the State Fire Marshal be to the common pleas court of the county in which the aggrieved person's building is located;
  - Requiring, instead of permitting, that appeals from specified administrative orders by any party who is not a resident of and has no place of business in Ohio be to the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas;
  - Allowing a party adversely affected by an agency's order to appeal to the common pleas court in the county in which the business of the party is located or in which the party is a resident in lieu of appealing to the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
- Modifies statutes governing adjudication orders of specified agencies to replace prior law regarding appeals of the orders to the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, the Environmental Division of the Franklin County Municipal Court, or the court of the county in which an appointing authority resides, with the act's venue provision described above.

### Special court procedures

- Provides special court procedures regarding the consideration and determination of:
  - Cases that, prior to October 3, 2023, would have been solely within the jurisdiction on appeal of the 10<sup>th</sup> District Court of Appeals, and that on that date are pending in a common pleas court and are not pending in the 10<sup>th</sup> District.
  - Matters that, on or after October 3, 2023, are being considered by a court of appeals other than the 10<sup>th</sup> District or a common pleas court within the territory of a court of appeals other than the 10<sup>th</sup> District and that, prior to October 3, 2023, would have been solely within the jurisdiction on appeal of the 10<sup>th</sup> District.

### No claim preclusion in zoning appeals

- Provides that a final judgment on the merits by a court pursuant to its power of review of administrative orders on claims brought under the law regarding county rural zoning or the renewal of slums and blighted areas in a county, the Township Zoning Law, or the law regarding municipal zoning, regional and county planning commissions, or interstate regional planning commissions does not preclude later claims for damages.

- States that the General Assembly intends that the above provisions in the respective laws be construed to override the federal Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in the case of *Lavon Moore v. Hiram Twp.*, 988 F.3d 353 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2021).

### **Residence qualifications of fiduciaries**

- Expands certain types of persons that qualify for appointment as executor or trustee of a will.
- Gives the court authorization to require private trust companies to appoint a resident agent.

### **Local court fees**

- Requires that a petition for a certificate of qualification for employment or an application for sealing or expungement of conviction records be accompanied by a \$50 fee, and may be accompanied by a local court fee up to \$50.

### **Liquefied gas (VETOED)**

- Would have exempted a liquefied petroleum gas supplier for damages based on a product liability claim in listed circumstances, unless the claim was caused in whole or in part by intentional misconduct by the supplier (VETOED).
- Would have presumed a user of liquefied petroleum gas is aware of the inherent dangerous characteristics of liquefied petroleum gas (VETOED).
- Would have found, as a matter of public policy, that liquefied petroleum gas, without modification, is not a defective product (VETOED).

### **Changes related to S.B. 288 of the 134<sup>th</sup> General Assembly**

- Makes a series of changes to the Criminal Code to correct inconsistencies, ambiguities, oversights, and technical issues created by the passage of S.B. 288 of the 134<sup>th</sup> General Assembly, including changes related to the following:
  - Sealing and expungement;
  - Criminal and traffic offense penalties;
  - Crime victims – notice and opportunity to be heard;
  - Adult Parole Authority warrantless search authority;
  - Removal of warrants from the National Crime Information Center;
  - Emergency judicial release;
  - Other technical changes.

## **Hamilton County Drug Court jurisdiction**

- Allows the Hamilton County Municipal Court to refer a case to the Drug Court of the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas if the case is eligible for admission to the Drug Court under a local rule adopted by the Hamilton County Common Pleas Court.
- Provides that a local rule may not permit referral of a case to the Drug Court if the case involves a first or second degree felony, a sex offense that is a third degree felony, or aggravated murder or murder.

## **Jurisdiction of Tiffin-Fostoria Municipal Court**

- Transfers Perry Township in Wood County from the territorial jurisdiction of the Tiffin-Fostoria Municipal Court to the territorial jurisdiction of the Bowling Green Municipal Court, effective January 2, 2024.
- Transfers Washington Township in Hancock County from the territorial jurisdiction of the Tiffin-Fostoria Municipal Court to the territorial jurisdiction of the Findlay Municipal Court, effective January 2, 2024.

## **Sandusky County County Court judgeship**

- Effective January 2, 2025, replaces the two part-time judges in the Sandusky County County Court with one full-time judge, to be elected in 2024, term to commence on January 2, 2025.
- Requires that, effective January 2, 2025, the compensation of the full-time judge of the Sandusky County County Court be the same as the compensation of a full-time municipal court judge.
- Removes all references in relevant statutes to “Sandusky County Municipal Court.”

## **Appeal of administrative agency order**

(R.C. 119.12, 124.34, 956.11, 956.15, 3794.09, 3901.321, 3913.13, 3913.23, 5101.35, and 5164.38; Section 701.130)

The act provides that a party adversely affected by an order of an agency issued pursuant to an adjudication may appeal from the order to the court of common pleas of the county designated as follows:

1. Except as otherwise described below in (2), an appeal from an order of an agency issued pursuant to an adjudication denying an applicant admission to an examination, denying the issuance or renewal of a license or registration of a licensee, revoking or suspending a license, or allowing the payment of a forfeiture rather than suspending operations of a liquor permit holder by order of the Liquor Control Commission must be filed in the county in which the place of business of the licensee is located or the county in which the licensee is a resident (prior law states that such an appeal may be filed in the court of common pleas in either of the specified counties).

2. An appeal from an order issued by any of the following agencies must be made to the Franklin County CCP or the court of common pleas in the county in which the place of business of the licensee is located or the county in which the licensee is a resident: (a) Liquor Control Commission, (b) Ohio Casino Control Commission, (c) State Medical Board, (d) State Chiropractic Board, (e) Board of Nursing, and (f) Bureau of Workers' Compensation regarding participation in the health partnership program administered by the Bureau (under prior law, such an appeal must be made to the Franklin County CCP).

3. Appeals from orders of the State Fire Marshal issued under R.C. Chapter 3737 must be to the court of common pleas of the county in which the building of the aggrieved person is located (under prior law, those appeals may be to that court of common pleas or to the Franklin County CCP).

4. As under continuing law, appeals under R.C. 124.34(B) from a decision of the State Personnel Board of Review or a municipal or civil service township civil service commission must be taken to the court of common pleas of the county in which the appointing authority is located or, in the case of an appeal by DRC, to the Franklin County CCP.

5. If a party appealing from an order described above in (1) or (2) or described below in (6) is not an Ohio resident and has no place of business in Ohio, the party must appeal to the Franklin County CCP (prior law states that such an appeal may be to the Franklin County CCP).

6. A party adversely affected by any order of an agency issued pursuant to any other adjudication may appeal to the Franklin County CCP or the court of common pleas of the county in which the business of the party is located or in which the party is a resident (under prior law, the party may appeal to the Franklin County CCP).

### **Appeal from order of specific agencies**

The act's provision above that a party adversely affected by an order of an agency may appeal from the order to the court of common pleas of the county in which the place of business of the party is located or the county in which the party is a resident is expressly made applicable to any of the following appeals:

- In cases of removal or reduction in pay for disciplinary reasons, the appointing authority or the officer or employee in the classified service may appeal from the decision of the State Personnel Board of Review or the municipal civil service commission of the city or city school district. The act replaces prior law that provides for the appeal to be made to the court of common pleas of the county in which the appointing authority is located, or to the Franklin County CCP.
- In cases in which the Director of Agriculture or a designated representative impounds and seizes a dog from a high volume breeder or dog broker for violation of applicable law or rule, the high volume breeder's owner or operator or the person acting as a dog broker may appeal from such determination at an adjudication hearing. The act replaces the prior provision that specifies that the appeal may be made only to the environmental division of the Franklin County Municipal Court.

- In cases in which an application for a license as a high volume breeder or dog broker is denied or such license is suspended or revoked upon a determination of the Director of Agriculture at an adjudication hearing, the applicant or licensee may appeal from such determination. The act replaces the prior provision that specifies that the appeal may be made only to the environmental division of the Franklin County Municipal Court.
- In cases in which a proprietor of a public place or place of employment or an individual against whom a finding of a violation of any prohibition under the Smoking Ban Law is made by the Director of the Department of Health or designee, the proprietor or individual may appeal the finding. The act replaces prior law that provides that the proprietor or individual may appeal the finding to the Franklin County CCP.
- In cases in which, after a public hearing, the Superintendent of Insurance issues an order of disapproval of any merger or other acquisition of control of a domestic insurer, the order may be appealed by filing a notice of appeal with the Superintendent and a copy of the notice of appeal with the court that will hear the appeal, within 15 calendar days after the transmittal of the copy of the order. The act replaces prior law that specifies that the order of disapproval may be appealed to the Franklin County CCP.
- In cases in which the Superintendent of Insurance issues an order regarding the conversion of a domestic mutual life insurance company to a stock life insurance company, an adversely affected policyholder may appeal the order. The act replaces prior law that provides that a policyholder adversely affected by such order may appeal to the Franklin County CCP.
- In cases in which the Superintendent of Insurance issues an order regarding the conversion of a domestic mutual insurance company other than life to a stock insurance corporation other than life, an adversely affected policyholder may appeal the order. The act replaces prior law that provides that a policyholder adversely affected by such order may appeal to the Franklin County CCP.
- In cases in which an appellant who appeals an order of an agency administering a family services program, who is granted a state hearing, and who disagrees with the state hearing decision and generally makes an administrative appeal to the Department of Job and Family Services (JFS), the appellant may appeal from the JFS administrative appeal decision. The act replaces prior law that provides that the person may appeal to the court of common pleas of the county in which the person resides, or to the Franklin County CCP if the person does not reside in Ohio. The act's new venue provision described above and continuing law on an appeal by a nonresident to the Franklin County CCP would apply, and the eliminated provision regarding a nonresident would be duplicative.
- In cases in which an adversely affected party may appeal from the Medicaid Department's adjudication order regarding: (1) refusal to enter into a provider agreement with a Medicaid provider, (2) refusal to revalidate a Medicaid provider's provider agreement, (3) suspension or termination of a Medicaid provider's provider agreement, or (4) taking any action based upon a final fiscal audit of a Medicaid provider. The act replaces prior

law that provides that any party who is adversely affected by the issuance of any such adjudication order may appeal to the Franklin County CCP.

## **Special court procedures**

Related to the provisions described above, the act specifies that:

1. All cases pending in the 10<sup>th</sup> District Court of Appeals on October 3, 2023, that were appropriately filed in that court are to be adjudicated by the 10<sup>th</sup> District;

2. All cases that, prior to October 3, 2023, would have been solely within the jurisdiction on appeal of the 10<sup>th</sup> District Court of Appeals, and on that date are pending in a common pleas court that is an appropriate venue and are not pending in the 10<sup>th</sup> District, are to be adjudicated by that common pleas court and remain solely within the jurisdiction on appeal of the 10<sup>th</sup> District, on and after October 3, 2023;

3. If, on or after October 3, 2023, a court of appeals other than the 10<sup>th</sup> District Court of Appeals or a common pleas court within the territory of a court of appeals other than the 10<sup>th</sup> District is considering a matter that, prior to October 3, 2023, would have been solely within the jurisdiction on appeal of the 10<sup>th</sup> District, the following apply:

a. The court of appeals or common pleas court considering the matter may consider judicial decisions of the Franklin County Common Pleas Court and the 10<sup>th</sup> District that were decided prior to October 3, 2023, in deciding the matter;

b. The judicial decisions of the Franklin County Common Pleas Court and the 10<sup>th</sup> District that were decided prior to October 3, 2023, are not binding on the court of appeals or common pleas court considering the matter; and

c. The court of appeals or common pleas court considering the matter is not required to issue any findings of fact explaining why the court, in deciding the matter, did not consider or follow any precedent on the matter set forth in any judicial decision of the Franklin County Common Pleas Court or the 10<sup>th</sup> District.

## **No claim preclusion in zoning appeals**

(R.C. 303.65, 519.26, and 713.16)

The act provides that a final judgment on the merits issued by a court of competent jurisdiction does not preclude later claims for damages, including civil actions for deprivation of rights under federal law, if the claim is brought under any of the following:

1. Laws governing county rural zoning or the renewal of slums and blighted areas in a county;

2. The Township Zoning Law; or

3. Laws governing municipal zoning, regional and county planning commissions, or interstate regional planning commissions.

This provision applies even if the common law doctrine of *res judicata* (where a matter has been adjudicated by a competent court and may not be pursued further by the same parties) would otherwise bar the claim.

The act states that the General Assembly intends that the above provisions in the respective laws be construed to override the federal Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in the case of *Lavon Moore v. Hiram Twp.*, 988 F.3d 353 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2021).

## **Residence qualifications of fiduciaries**

(R.C. 2109.21)

The act expands the types of persons that qualify for appointment as an executor or trustee of a will to include a private trust company or family trust company organized under the laws of any state. The act also authorizes courts to require an appointed nonresident private trust company or family trust company, to appoint a resident agent to accept service of process, notices, and other documents.

## **Local court fees**

### **Certificate of qualification for employment**

(R.C. 2953.25)

The act stipulates that the fee for a petition for a certificate of qualification for employment is \$50, and may be accompanied by a local court fee up to \$50. Under former law, the \$50 fee included local court fees. Under continuing law, part or all of the fee may be waived for an applicant who presents a poverty affidavit showing the applicant is indigent.

### **Application for sealing or expungement of conviction records**

(R.C. 2953.32)

The act stipulates that the fee for an application to seal or expunge conviction records is \$50, and may be accompanied by a local court fee up to \$50. Under former law, the \$50 fee included local court fees. Under continuing law, the fee may be waived for an applicant who presents a poverty affidavit showing the applicant is indigent.

## **Liquefied gas (VETOED)**

(R.C. 2307.781)

The Governor vetoed a provision that would have exempted a liquefied petroleum gas supplier from liability for damages based on a product liability claim arising from:

- The installation, modification, repair, or servicing of liquefied petroleum gas equipment by a person other than the liquefied petroleum gas supplier, unless the liquefied petroleum gas supplier had received written notification or other actual knowledge of the installation, modification, repair, or servicing at least 30 days before the installation, modification, repair, or servicing occurred.
- The use or operation of liquefied petroleum gas equipment in a manner or for a purpose other than that for which it was intended.

- The installation, modification, repair, or servicing of liquefied petroleum gas equipment by a person, other than the liquefied petroleum gas supplier, who is not certified or licensed to install, modify, repair, or service that equipment.
- The installation, modification, repair, or servicing of liquefied petroleum gas equipment by a person, other than the liquefied petroleum gas supplier, that did not conform to the warning or instruction of the manufacturer of the liquefied petroleum gas equipment.
- Use that complied with listed legal requirements.

The exemptions would not have applied in situations where the product liability claim was caused in whole or in part by intentional misconduct by the liquefied petroleum gas supplier.

The act would have included the presumption that a user was aware of the inherent dangerous characteristics of liquefied petroleum gas, and would not have required a supplier to provide a warning regarding liquefied petroleum gas excepted as specified in the Revised Code or Administrative Code.

The act would have stated that, as a matter of public policy, the General Assembly found that liquefied petroleum gas, without modification, is not a defective product.

## **Changes related to S.B. 288 of the 134<sup>th</sup> General Assembly**

### **Sealing and expungement**

(R.C. 2953.31, 2953.32, 2953.33, and 2953.34)

The act allows a defendant who is found not guilty of an offense, who is named in a dismissed complaint, indictment, or information, or against whom a no bill is entered by a grand jury, to apply to the court for an order to expunge the person's official records in the case. The process for expungement, as added by the act, mirrors the process for sealing records in cases of dismissal, not guilty, or no bill. Additionally, expungement of records related to a dismissed or no bill case is not available if the case involves any of the following offenses:

1. A violation of Ohio's Commercial Driver's License Law, Driver's License Law, Driver's License Suspension Law, Traffic Law, or Motor Vehicle Criminal Law, or a violation of a municipal ordinance that is substantially similar to any of those laws.
2. A felony offense of violence that is not a sexually oriented offense.
3. A sexually oriented offense when the offender is subject to the requirements of R.C. Chapter 2950 (SORN Law).
4. An offense involving a victim younger than 13, except for the offenses of nonsupport of dependents or contributing to nonsupport of dependents.
5. A first or second degree felony.
6. A "domestic violence" offense, a "violating a protection order" offense, or a similar municipal ordinance offense.



7. A third degree felony if the person has more than one prior conviction of any felony or, if the person has exactly one prior conviction of a third degree felony and the person has more prior convictions in total than a third degree felony conviction and two misdemeanor convictions.

S.B. 288 of the 134<sup>th</sup> General Assembly similarly enacted new provisions under which a person may apply for expungement of a *conviction* record in the same manner that a person may apply for sealing of a conviction record, and specified that the procedures applicable to determining a sealing application also generally apply to such an expungement application. The act clarifies that expungement of criminal records under these provisions requires the destruction, deletion, or erasure of those records so that those records are permanently irretrievable, except to the extent they are kept by the Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation for the limited purpose of determining an individual's qualification or disqualification for law enforcement employment.

Additionally, the act prohibits the sealing or expungement of convictions of a third degree felony if the offender has more than one other conviction of any felony or, if the person has exactly two convictions of a third degree felony, has more convictions in total than those two third degree felony convictions and two misdemeanor convictions. It also allows for the sealing of a conviction of fourth degree misdemeanor domestic violence, but prohibits expungement of the record. Finally, the act allows a person who has been arrested for any misdemeanor offense and who has effected a bail forfeiture for the offense to apply for the expungement of a record of a misdemeanor offense after one year, or after six months for a minor misdemeanor, rather than three years as under prior law.

Regarding sealed records specifically, the act permits a legal representative of a person who is the subject of sealed records to apply to allow the subject to inspect them, exempts officers or employees of the state or a political subdivision from liability for disclosing sealed or expunged records to the subject or the subject's legal representative, and corrects erroneous cross references.

## **Criminal and traffic offense penalties**

(R.C. 2907.231 and 4511.204)

### **Engaging in prostitution**

The act eliminates an ambiguity in prescribed penalties for the criminal offense of engaging in prostitution. Continuing law prohibits, as "engaging in prostitution," a person from recklessly inducing, enticing, or procuring another to engage in sexual activity for hire in exchange for the person giving anything of value to the other person. A violation is a first degree misdemeanor. If the other person is a person with a developmental disability and the offender knows or has reason to believe that is the case, the offense is engaging in prostitution with a person with a developmental disability, a third degree felony. Continuing law also requires the sentencing court to require the offender to attend an education or treatment program aimed at preventing behavior that constitutes "engaging in prostitution" and allows the court to impose a fine on the offender of up to \$1,500, despite the financial penalties that ordinarily apply to a first degree misdemeanor.

The act makes clear that the requirement for education or treatment aimed at behavior that constitutes “engaging in prostitution” applies to all offenders convicted of “engaging in prostitution” or “engaging in prostitution with a person with a developmental disability” and clarifies that the \$1,500 maximum fine that applies to a violation does not apply to “engaging in prostitution with a person with a developmental disability,” a third degree felony.

### **Distracted driving**

(R.C. 4511.204)

S.B. 288 amended Ohio’s distracted driving law to create the new unclassified misdemeanor offense of “operating a motor vehicle while using an electronic wireless communication device.” Penalties prescribed for the offense may be escalated if the offender has previously been convicted of the offense. Continuing law allows for offenders subject to a \$150 penalty and points assessment for this offense to avoid the penalty and points by attending a distracted driving safety course. The act clarifies that this penalty waiver applies only to offenses that do not involve a prior conviction within two years of the violation.

### **Crime victims – notice and opportunity to be heard**

(R.C. 2930.171, 2953.39, and 2967.26)

The act applies the notice and victim consideration requirements to the Revised Code sections enacted in S.B. 288 to conform them to the crime victim’s rights provisions of H.B. 343 of the 134<sup>th</sup> General Assembly.

### **Victims reimbursing for law enforcement services**

(R.C. 2930.20)

The act modifies the prohibition against charging a victim of rape, attempted rape, domestic violence, dating violence, abuse, or a sexually oriented offense, or the property owner where the victim resides for the cost of law enforcement assistance related to the offense so that it applies to victims of rape, attempted rape, domestic violence, dating violence, or a sexually oriented offense, and not to victims of “abuse” generally. Additionally, the act defines “dating violence” and “sexually oriented offense” for purposes of the prohibition.

### **Adult Parole Authority warrantless searches**

(R.C. 2967.131)

The act expands the search authority of the Adult Parole Authority to allow authorized field officers to search the person, residence, motor vehicle, and other personal property of a felon released from prison on post-release control when the Authority requires the felon’s consent to searches as part of terms and conditions of post-release control.

### **Removal of warrants from NCIC**

(R.C. 2935.10)

The act narrows to “tier one offenses” a requirement that a law enforcement agency remove a warrant from the Law Enforcement Automated Data System (LEADS) and the appropriate National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database within 48 hours of warrant

service or dismissal or recall by the issuing court. Under continuing law, a “tier one offense” is one of 32 specified serious offenses, and any warrant issued for a tier one offense must be entered, by the law enforcement agency requesting the warrant within 48 hours after receipt of the warrant, into the LEADS and the appropriate NCIC database.

### **Emergency judicial release**

(R.C. 2929.20)

Continuing law allows for a special procedure for the judicial release of certain qualifying offenders during a state of emergency. The act clarifies that the once-every-six-months filing limit for emergency-qualifying offender judicial release applies separately to each declared state of emergency. The act also requires the court ruling on a motion for judicial release of an emergency-qualifying offender to notify the prosecuting attorney of that ruling and clarifies that the prosecuting attorney must notify the victim’s representative, if applicable, if the court grants a motion for judicial release or if a hearing is held on an offender’s judicial release or revocation of judicial release.

### **Other technical changes**

(R.C. 2743.671, 2907.13, 2925.11, 2930.06, and 4731.862)

S.B. 288 addressed the matter of emergency awards for reparations of “funeral expenses” for victims of crime. The act clarifies that “funeral expenses” for that purpose, means the payment of cremation or burial services of the decedent, rather than the potentially competing definition of “funeral expenses” that applies to the Crime Victims Reparations Law generally.

S.B. 288 also enacted a civil action for the recovery of remedies for an assisted reproduction procedure performed without consent “and performed recklessly.” S.B. 288 stated that a person may bring a separate action for each child born to the patient or spouse as a result of an assisted reproduction procedure performed without consent – but in this provision, it did not include as a criterion that the procedure was “performed recklessly.” The act adds this criterion.

The act also corrects an apparently erroneous reference to “health care provider” in the criminal offense of fraudulent assisted reproduction. It replaces the erroneous reference with a reference to a “health care professional,” a defined term in the offense of fraudulent assisted reproduction.

The act eliminates the orphaned definition of “drug treatment program” from the so-called “good Samaritan law” that applies to specified minor drug possession offenses. The phrase “drug treatment program” is not used in that law.

Finally, the act corrects an incomplete cross-reference to Ohio’s Speedy-Trial Law.

### **Hamilton County Drug Court jurisdiction**

(R.C. 1901.041 and 2301.03)

The act modifies the jurisdiction of the Drug Court of the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas. Under the act, the Hamilton County Municipal Court may refer a case to the Drug

Court if the case is eligible for admission to the Drug Court under a local rule adopted by the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas. However, a local rule adopted by the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas may not permit referral of a case to the Drug Court if the case involves a first or second degree felony, a sex offense that is a third degree felony, or aggravated murder or murder. The act repeals statutory provisions that specified the types of cases that may be referred to the Drug Court.

## **Jurisdiction of Tiffin-Fostoria Municipal Court**

(R.C. 1901.02 and 1901.021; Section 701.160)

### **Bowling Green Municipal Court – Perry Township in Wood County**

The act transfers Perry Township in Wood County from the territorial jurisdiction of the Tiffin-Fostoria Municipal Court to the territorial jurisdiction of the Bowling Green Municipal Court, effective January 2, 2024. Under prior law, Perry Township, except for the municipal corporation of West Millgrove in Wood County, was within the territorial jurisdiction of the Tiffin-Fostoria Municipal Court. West Millgrove was within the territorial jurisdiction of the Bowling Green Municipal Court. Cases arising in Perry Township, except for those arising within the municipal corporation of West Millgrove, were filed in the office of the special deputy clerk in Fostoria.

The act specifies that all cases arising in Perry Township in Wood County that are pending in the Fostoria branch of the Tiffin-Fostoria Municipal Court on January 2, 2024, are to be adjudicated by the Fostoria branch of the Tiffin-Fostoria Municipal Court. All cases arising in Perry Township in Wood County on or after January 2, 2024, are to be brought before the Bowling Green Municipal Court.

### **Findlay Municipal Court – Washington Township in Hancock County**

The act transfers Washington Township in Hancock County from the territorial jurisdiction of the Tiffin-Fostoria Municipal Court to the territorial jurisdiction of the Findlay Municipal Court, effective January 2, 2024. Under prior law, Washington Township in Hancock County was within the territorial jurisdiction of the Tiffin-Fostoria Municipal Court. Cases arising in Washington Township were filed in the office of the special deputy clerk located in Fostoria.

The act specifies that all cases arising in Washington Township in Hancock County that are pending in the Fostoria branch of the Tiffin-Fostoria Municipal Court on January 2, 2024, are to be adjudicated by the Fostoria branch of the Tiffin-Fostoria Municipal Court. All cases arising in Washington Township in Hancock County on or after January 2, 2024, are to be brought before the Findlay Municipal Court.

## **Sandusky County County Court judges**

(R.C.1901.01, 1901.02, 1901.07, 1901.08, 1901.31, and 1907.11)

Effective January 2, 2025, the act replaces the two part-time judges in the Sandusky County County Court with one full-time judge, to be elected in 2024, the term to commence on January 2, 2025. Effective January 2, 2025, notwithstanding the continuing law specifying the

base compensation and additional compensation of county court judges, the full-time judge must receive the compensation equal to the compensation of a full-time municipal court judge.

Effective January 2, 2025, the act abolishes one part-time judgeship of that county court elected in 2018 and whose term expires December 31, 2024, and abolishes the other part-time judgeship elected in 2018 and whose term expires January 1, 2025.

The act repeals the creation of the Sandusky County Municipal Court. It removes all references to “Sandusky County Municipal Court” in the relevant statutes pertaining to the Sandusky County Municipal Court.